Conflicting Signals: USTR Ups Pressure on China and Treasury Talks Lifting Tariffs

Messaging is everything in international diplomacy, especially around high-level negotiations. After the latest round of U.S.-China trade talks in Beijing, all signs pointed to a successful outcome. An extra day was added beyond the planned two days of talks. Vice Premier Liu He made a short appearance at the lower-lower-level gathering of deputies. The U.S. Deputy Agriculture Secretary had glowing words after the meeting (though curiously no one from USTR spoke during the coveted press briefing.) Trump even tweeted shortly afterwards that the talks had gone very well.

And then the messaging changed, at least from USTR. 

Lighthizer said last week, according to Sen. Grassley who had met with him Friday, that he hadn’t seen the structural changes he was looking for from China. That’s a major sticking point for the White House and something Trump has repeatedly said must be addressed to avoid raising tariffs from 10% to 25% on Chinese goods.

It is an odd complaint since China would likely only agree to the far more difficult issues face-to-face at Cabinet-level negotiations with either USTR Lighthizer or President Trump. The Beijing meeting was a the Deputy level, a.k.a. not the decision makers.

Lighthizer also announced that if talks don’t work out, U.S. companies could apply for exclusions to the 25% tariffs on $200 billion of imports from China that are set to take affect in March.

That’s a weak nod to the U.S. business community who were directly affected by the 10% tariffs and are likely lobbying hard for a resolution to the trade impasse. The promise of exclusions provide cold comfort since the aim of the next round of tariffs is to put even more pressure on China. Any exclusions would weaken that influence. Approvals would likely be slow-rolled by the administration. 

USTR now appears to be trying to get out in front and push their hardline agenda ahead of the Jan. 30-31 talks. Sen. Grassley commented in a briefing to the press that since China’s economy is ailing there’s a chance to get more progress on these harder issues, which include IP protection, forced tech transfer, and stealing trade secrets.

These issues aren’t going away. The Department of Justice is now looking into whether Huawei stole robotic technology from T-Mobile.

To further complicate the administration’s signaling, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin has been discussing lifting tariffs as an incentive for China to make an equally bold move, though it’s unclear what that could be considering the depth of structural changes needed to satisfy U.S. concerns.

Since China isn’t going to agree to the U.S. list of over one hundred issues raised, and Trump isn’t going to accept some token purchases of U.S. goods and nothing else, some kind of compromise is necessary. What Grassley and other White House hardliners may not fully accept is that Trump’s approval ratings are plummeting, major U.S. companies are feeling the effects of the tariffs, and Trump himself may be itching for a settlement.

Compromise isn’t really in Trump’s winner-take-all approach and his impulsiveness can lead to unexpected outcomes (e.g. the Wall shutdown). The U.S. and China have been locked in a mutually reinforcing death spiral of tariff-raising for the past year and time is on no one’s side here.

USTR should certainly push for everything they can get. If cooler heads prevail, some sort of short-term relief with continued tariffs on some Chinese goods, and a plan to tackle the harder issues over time is the most likely outcome.

Both sides might not get exactly what they what, but it’s certainly better than the global economic carnage of a prolonged trade war and Trump really looks like he could use a win right now.


For commentary and analysis straight to your inbox subscribe above and connect via Twitter: https://twitter.com/brianpklein

Deal or No Deal in U.S.-China Trade Talks

U.S. negotiators are heading back after an extended trade negotiation with their Chinese counterparts in Beijing. While there’s been no formal agreement yet, both sides are expected to make public announcements on Thursday. If talks had gone badly something would have come out in the official Chinese state-run press by now, so all signs point to some kind of deal. Will it, however solve any of the more difficult challenges in the relationship?

Trump wants to see markets rebound. Chasing the sugar high of a stock jump is hardly a trade policy, and a terrible negotiating position. This essentially gave China added negotiating leverage knowing he is eager to settle. That doesn’t bode well for any substantial movement on the most difficult issues facing U.S. exporters — forced tech transfer, non-tariff barriers, and intellectual property theft. That was the whole reason Trump launched his ill-thought out trade war in the first place by ratcheting up tariffs on Chinese goods.

If there’s no movement on those hard issues, what was the point? China announced they’re going to be buying U.S. soybeans again, but China was already buying U.S. soybeans before Trump’s tariffs. That’s not a concession. 

China also announced that U.S. rice would be allowed into their market. While this is new, market access isn’t likely to dent the trade deficit as U.S. rice prices are significantly higher than other suppliers to China, most notable from Southeast Asia.

Other Chinese government moves included reduction in auto-tariffs, already offered to the rest of the world. While some legal reforms have been mentioned, enhancing IPR protection for example, changes in law are often not fully implemented. Given the inherently political nature of China’s judicial system, companies have little recourse.

These “structural” reforms tend to be the most difficult, often edging too close to issues that party hardliners in Beijing hold dear (e.g. favorable government and financial support to state-owned enterprises.) They’ll most likely kick the can down the road like they have for years and wait out what’s left of the Trump presidency.

That’s the crux of these negotiations. Are Chinese officials convinced that Trump will hold his line or will he cave to his own domestic economic pressures? It’s looking like Trump’s eagerness for a win will trump his own hardliners who are pushing for China to fundamentally change the way they do business. While that’s a laudable goal, they’ve used the wrong tool for this kind of heavy lifting.

Adding to the uncertainty, no senior-level negotiator was present for the talks. This was more of a working level negotiation and all of the familiar figures in Washington need to give their input including U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer, Treasury Sec. Mnuchin, and Advisers Navarro and Kudlow. Interestingly it was mainly the Agriculture Deputy Secretary who spoke to the press, not the USTR Deputy Secretary, who ostensibly led the negotiations.

So what did Trump get out of all this turmoil? Hard to say until tomorrow, and there’s still three weeks to the March deadline, but there will be plenty of spin about the great, great, concessions that no U.S. president has ever gotten from China before. 

Expect an announcement highlighting all the U.S. goods China is going buy as a result. For comparison, from Jan. to Oct. 2018 China bought $102.5 billion in U.S. goods. Over the same period in 2017 the number was $104.5 billion (U.S. Census data for 2018 is currently available through Oct.) If the structural issues aren’t resolved, don’t expect too much difference in overall U.S. exports, especially as China’s economy slows down.

Markets react quickly to news, and then adjust to facts. Trump might still get his temporary stock bump, but a sugar high never lasts. China is playing the long game and a fickle market movement is about as small a win as it gets. 


For commentary and analysis straight to your inbox subscribe above and connect via Twitter: https://twitter.com/brianpklein

Trump Has Few Options on Huawei Sanctions Trouble

Time is running out on the U.S. extradition request for Huawei’s CFO, Meng Wanzhong who was arrested in Canada in December. This follows an investigation on sanctions-busting by the firm related to business ties with Iran. Trump said that he might intervene in the case if it helped with the China trade impasse and for national security reasons.  As much as he’d like to use the Huawei case for political purposes he actually has few options. 

Intervening creates a dangerous linkage between national security issues and trade politics. China routinely engages in this type of politicization, and is part and parcel of their attempts to influence other countries over a variety of perceived slights. In 2017 South Korea’s Lotte department store chain shut its China operations after a concerted government effort to thwart their business (stores were suddenly hit with fire hazard violations,) when the firm gave up land to the South Korean government for a U.S. THAAD missile defense system installation. In 2011 the Chinese gov’t banned Norwegian salmon after the Nobel Prize was awarded to Liu Xiabo, a Chinese dissident who later died while in custody.

State Department Issues China Travel Warning for Americans

The U.S. is not China, and a Trump intervention would signal that the rule of law is no longer the rule of the land. The political backlash from left, right, and what remains of the center would be swift and significant.

Political intervention would make Trump look weak on China, again. Trump already gave Xi Jinping a huge gift when he lifted a ban on ZTE after its own Iran sanctions trouble. The company would have gone out of business without that commercial “pardon” to continue purchasing U.S. technology. Xi Jinping did not return the favor and blocked Qualcomm’s $44 billion purchase of NXP. China was the only country standing in the way. 

Canda Warns U.S. Not to Politicize Extradition Case (Reuters)

That’s not to say Trump won’t try, but a criminal case is harder to interfere with than the ZTE sanctions case. Politically, Democrats have the majority in the House and will hit from the left. Hardline Republicans, who want a more forceful policy on China, will strike from the right. And any meddling in the Department of Justice while Mueller’s investigations remain open would be a huge red flag for those considering impeachment hearings.

The only option is to let the legal system run its course. While this may inflame tensions with China in the short term, it reduces the chances of a U.S. political backlash.

Don’t be surprised though if Trump surprises us all and defies the collective wisdom with an impulsive response if Canada agrees with the extradition request. While he has the power to free Huawei’s CFO, promising more than he can deliver ahead of time may prove that a Trump promise made, is a promise easily broken. That would significantly weaken his trade negotiating position vis-a-vis China.


For commentary and analysis straight to your inbox subscribe above and connect via Twitter: https://twitter.com/brianpklein

U.S.-China Trade Deal Already in Doubt

 

Trump Chaos Rattles China Trade Negotiations Before They Even Begin

Just days after President Trump claimed success in trade disputes with China, disagreement over the details have emerged. That rings with a familiar tune.

The Trump-Kim Summit this past June in Singapore raised similar doubts about what, if anything, was actually accomplished. It turns out that even with a loosely worded document we now know that nothing was formalized after that highly touted success.

While North Korea continues to develop missiles and possibly more nuclear weapons, Trump complains he hasn’t been offered the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. 

The Saturday Trump-Xi dinner in Buenos Aires didn’t even offer anything in writing and journalists were left guessing why applause erupted from behind closed doors as the dinner ended. There was no press conference or photo op to clear up the issue as Trump & Co. headed for the airport.

After landing, Trump claimed Chinese auto tariffs were being lifted. The White House has now walked that back. Trump claimed China would spend over $1 trillion on U.S. goods. His economic advisor Larry Kudlow said that was more aspirational than specific and would be determined by private entities and economic conditions. Trump said if China doesn’t make bold moves in ninety days, he’s Mr. Tariff, and then suggested the timeline might be extended.

No one knows what success looks like three months from now, and that’s a serious problem.

Now China has expressed its discontent with the White House version of winning it all. Yet again, Trump excels at undiplomatic posturing while others are left to clean up his mess.

The pattern here is clear. Trump’s erratic words cannot be trusted, only managed, even by those closest to him. It’s another episode of “Promises Made, Promises Broken.”

U.S. markets didn’t like that kind of uncertainty, and along with other negative financial news on Tuesday, they shed over 3% in one of the worst days in their history. 

Making matters worse, US Trade Representative Lighthizer replaced Treasury Secretary Mnuchin as lead negotiator. Lighthizer is a known China hawk, and while having someone strong-willed and skeptical at the table is an advantage, if the lead isn’t considered to be negotiating in good faith that will not end well for bilateral relations or the international trading system.

The biggest risk at the end of February will be China claiming they did everything they said they would do and the U.S. saying whatever they did wasn’t enough.

Chinese state media has already started making the list and announced increased punishments for firms found guilty of IP theft, but will they be implemented?   

If Trump really wants to reduce the trade deficit, protect intellectual property, and remove investment barriers, he and his team are going to have to be far more disciplined than they have been to date, and that seems highly unlikely.

Playing loose and fast with the facts, tweeting exaggerated wins, and painting Chinese negotiators into a corner will not make this relationship work. Both sides have to be able win.

 

What the China Stock Market Crash Really Tells Us (and What It Doesn’t)

Monday morning headlines were more sobering than a double shot of espresso, adding anxiety to an already tumultuous few weeks in China. The Shanghai index dropped 8.5%, in one day, again. This after a see-saw struggle to regain momentum with similar drops from mid-June’s dizzying peak of over 5,000.

The consequences of such a serious correction, with a Monday close at 3209.91, are neither dire nor surprising and the ensuing panic will likely bring out a host of incorrect linkages.

Here are three misconceptions of what the crash seems to mean, but doesn’t.

1. The China market crash will destroy the U.S. economy

U.S. exports to China totaled a mere 7% of total U.S. exports year to date. Canada and Mexico represent a combined 34%.

Exports in general make up an extremely small percentage of the U.S. $18 trillion economy (about 8%) and exports to China represent an even smaller amount.

Over two-thirds of all U.S. economic activity is driven by consumers. The biggest impact on that activity is whether people feel they have more money to spend today than yesterday, not on whether day traders in Pudong are pulling their money out of Sinopec shares.

2. Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets represent the broader Chinese economy  

Usually a broad-based stock market sell-off represents a belief that the underlying economy isn’t going to do as well going forward as it has in the past. That’s the rational explanation assuming near perfect knowledge of economic conditions. Even the U.S. market doesn’t work that efficiently (there are sell-offs even without new negative economic information.)

In China, knowledge of the broader economic slowdown has been around for a while. If the markets were rational they should have been dropping when the government announced lower growth targets back in March. They should have dropped as alternate economic measures hinted that the official 7% growth rate might not be reached.

Instead they continued to climb based primarily on two non-economic beliefs. The self-fulfilling prophecy that the market could only go up and that the Chinese government would prop up any market weakness. Win-win.

Since domestic savers have very limited choices of where to put their money, once the real estate two-step dance was over (buy one to live-in, buy one to hold) the stock market became the only game in town attracting a flood of capital. That rush caused prices to rise which attracted even more investment, much of it borrowed on margin. Thus the illusion of a perpetually rising market.

The Shanghai composite has now dropped below the magical 3,500 level where many believed the Chinese government would step in with massive buying to push prices back up. The illusion of invincibility appears to be faltering. Meanwhile online sales in the real economy continue to expand.

In this market there is no irrational exuberance with Chinese characteristics, just irrational exuberance as rationality returns to the market.

3. The China sell-off is similar to previous Asian financial crises   

In 1997 the Thai Baht came under heavy pressure resulting in large scale contagion throughout the region. A heavily reliance on trade with a market-determined exchange rates drove this spread. China has neither.

China’s yuan, despite recent changes, remains a managed currency. The government still decides on its opening daily price. That means speculators cannot significantly alter its value beyond a government imposed trading band of +/- 2 percent per day.

China’s economy is also far less reliant on trade than in the past as government investment in infrastructure as well as real estate development have become main drivers of growth. Of those industries dependent on trade China’s recent devaluation made Chinese exports cheaper (a dollar or euro buys more today than in the recent past).

What does the recent sell-off really tell us?

The Chinese government is going to have an increasingly difficult time trying to stop the carnage. Despite conventional wisdom, it does not have unlimited power. By even trying to manage the sell-off, policymakers have placed themselves in an extremely difficult situation.

If they can’t right the market as people expect the government looks weak. If they impose even more draconian rules to stop sellers from liquidating they may kill interest in the market as a whole. Lose-lose.

Apple’s Tim Cook, for one is not that concerned about purchasing habits in China. Let’s hope that the nascent middle class has more cash stashed at home that they’re willing to spend than most people think.

Meanwhile the China market crash has caused a flash sale on a host of solid U.S. equities.

China Devaluation Latest Sign of Market Weakness

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) devalued the renminbi yesterday in the latest sign that market forces continue to weaken in the world’s second largest economy.

Exports have fallen. Growth is likely far slower than the official 7% rate. Electricity usage is down. Steel production has declined. Infrastructure investment yields less impact. Even demographics highlight a shrinking workforce (enter the robots). And then there’s the stock market, largely divorced from the underlying economy and gyrating like hips at a hula hoop competition.

Currency devaluation will do little to reverse these trends.

As a short term fix it may help exporters whose goods are now cheaper to buy abroad, slow capital flight (it costs more to convert renminbi into other currencies) and potentially attract more foreign investment into the country (a U.S. dollar today buys more renminbi than a dollar yesterday).

But the underlying economic uncertainty in China’s partial transition to domestic led growth will continue to weigh heavily on the minds of international investors and policymakers alike.

If China truly wants to make the renminbi a global reserve currency the PBOC will have to reverse itself and let the currency float freely like the yen, euro and pound. That requires giving up managing a trading band around a fixed daily rate. Economic conditions would have to improve significantly before moves in that direction resume (almost certainly a gradual step-by-step process).

None of this means a hard landing for China’s go-go economy, but resorting to a currency devaluation highlights the limited policy options left for a government navigating increasingly choppy waters.

Remaining moves (and ones largely ignored to date) include government heavily investing in a social safety net, improving health care coverage and promoting more affordable housing. That will allow households to free up some of their savings to spend and spur new business creation.

Until this happens expect more partial solutions and continued volatility.

U.S. Needs an Asia Re-Pivot

Legacy must be on Obama’s mind these days as his two-term presidency nears an end. It might seem early, but the approaching 2016 election cycle starts in earnest as soon as Hilary Clinton announces her candidacy. That could be only months away. Then the media cycle fills with coverage of every presidential hopeful’s latest utterance and Congressional paralysis settles in.

Little can be done in twenty months that hasn’t been accomplished in six years save for some much needed focus on longer-term policy. This positioning was supposed to include an “Asia Pivot”, loosely defined and broadly conceived. So far it has lived up to its conception.

Enter news of a China-led3-23_aiib_2 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) featuring participation of major allies the UK, France, Germany, Australia, South Korea and now Japan*. Glaringly absent, the U.S.

What’s stopping U.S. involvement? Partly an inherited pride from post-World War II institution-building that created the IMF and World Bank. Opponents highlight the risk of the bank becoming a potential instrument of Chinese regional soft power, a potential lack of transparency and less stringent lending standards that may erode development criteria created over the past several decades. These include social imperatives, environmental standards and labor protections.

While these remain reasonable concerns, China already lends heavily throughout the region. No amount of outside pressure has influenced how this aid has been disbursed or under what terms.

Only involvement with this new multilateral institution opens the door to engagement with China and the region on development issues.  With little cost, potentially none at first except for some diplomatic formalities, the U.S. could play an influential role in the first round of serious regional economic institution building since the 1966 formation of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Foregoing a role, even a limited one, pivots the U.S. further away from Asia signaling that the U.S., while espousing support for regional integration, does little to back-up those ideals.

As regional trading patterns increasingly revolve around China’s economy a new constellation of partners will define the regional development agenda, with or without U.S. involvement. Avoiding the AIIB risks forfeiting hard won gains. Asia will then see the U.S. primarily through a narrow security lens.

Refusing to work with China and the rest of Asia, even when the terms are not ideal, is not a legacy worth leaving.

* Note: After publication Japan changed course and announced it would not be joining the bank at this time.

@brianpklein

For more on the issue see:

Image: Xinhua/Li Xin

What Does Xi Want?

South China SeaFor so many years now the rhetoric coming out of China was “peaceful rise” and “non-intervention”. And then by stealth, diplomacy and economic might a shift occurred turning a policy of biding one’s time into action. This new muscular foreign policy, under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, increasingly fractures a status quo that has maintained stability in Asia for over half a century.

Gaining control over the Spratley Islands and laying claim to the greater South China Sea have re-drawn long established boundaries and defied international norms. This is the new China order.

While countries throughout the region, including the U.S., continue to express their diplomatic discontent in press releases and regional gatherings, an unimpeded land and sea grab expands. Other nations talk. China takes.

Water cannon volleys between Chinese and Vietnamese ships have now escalated to hard objects and ramming hulls (water cannons were also used by Chinese “enforcement” ships against the Philippines back in February). An oil rig planted its drill within Vietnam’s internationally recognized economic zone without consequence. Chinese construction has begun on a hotly contested island chain also claimed by the Philippines.

All of these actions contradict in word and deed the pronouncements of the Xi government through APEC speeches, bilateral conversations, and international gatherings that no unilateral actions would upset the status quo. Consultation, not force, was meant to guide resolution of historical tensions.

What does the Xi government really want? — A reckoning with history to re-write the past and lay claim to what was “taken” decades and even centuries ago under a selective reading of China’s place in the region and the world.

And yet China has developed at remarkable speed, largely because of this very international system that provides it access to the world’s resources and markets. In a different time, a country would have needed to field a global military presence to keep the peace, maintain the shipping lanes and facilitate international trade.

These latest confrontations and a weak international response sets a dangerous precedent for the system that has long been welcoming China’s rise. President Xi doesn’t want to embrace a world not of his own making. He wants to re-write the world’s terms to reap even larger benefits at the expense of his neighbors. That includes re-drawing boundaries of influence throughout Asia.

Until countries take heed and begin working with concerted action, China will continue to free ride and impose its considerable economic influence to mold the world in its own image. A region not united will eventually be divided.

For more on the crisis:

“Road to Fame” Explores China’s Youthful Aspirations and Angst

Six pairs of eyes follow each single child in China says a teacher at Beijing’s prestigious Central Academy of Drama – parents and two sets of grandparents. That puts a lot of pressure on them to succeed.

In an economy undergoing dramatic change and slowing growth, the culture of competition long thought to be an artifact of western decadence and decline, quickly becomes the new norm. The striving for opportunity and material comforts has now become a common global culture.

Director Hao Wu’s documentary “Road to Fame”, which screened to a sell-out crowd at IFC Center as part of the DOC NYC film festival, explores these themes and more as he details the first ever Broadway-China collaboration on a student production of “Fame, the Musical”.

The subjects of the documentary reflect the hopes and fears of students faced with the daunting prospects of making a living for the first times in their lives – relatively sheltered university life colliding with class distinctions and the advantages wealth brings to any budding artistic career.

RoadtoFame

China’s “Generation Now” wants what it wants and expects to get it sooner rather than later – a not unfamiliar theme in modern “20-something” generations. At some point China will have its own version of “Friends” where the lyrics “my job’s a joke, I’m broke , my love life’s D.O.A.” will resonate as loudly there as it did for a decade and more in syndication in the U.S.

The film itself, in parts sympathetic and brutally honest about the future of performing artists chasing stardom reflects much of the musical’s own messages. Not everyone makes it. Talent takes you only so far. And who you know counts for more than anyone really wants to admit.

Perhaps most striking is the film’s acceptance in China itself as Hao hinted at a major broadcast sell in the mainland during the Q&A (the film received crowd-funding via Kickstarter and several grants). Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” rhetoric not withstanding, domestic interest in China’s own aspirational classes headline even state-run publications, a stark difference to the steel manufacturing output numbers of only fifteen years ago.

Potentially sensitive political undertones, including corruption and China’s one child policy, seep through in moments. But over the five years from original filming to final editing, China has changed. Luxury-goods sales are on the decline, attributed to the crack down on corrupt politicians, though cash cards are now the preferred currency of influence. The latest Communist Party conclave announced relaxed family planning restrictions, ostensibly an end to government forced abortions, clearing the way for officially recognized multi-child families.

Here “Road to Fame” captures those moments when youthful exuberance tempers with time as students face the brink of adulthood. One can only hope that China’s “gen now” matures into the next generation of reform where widening the door to opportunity for a broader spectrum of society becomes more the norm than the rhetorical exception – something the U.S. still struggles with itself.

Asia Tensions Reach New Highs

North Korea’s rounds of provocation tempered with inaction continue to challenge regional powers. Sanctions appear to have had little affect on the new regime, but perhaps some additional pressure from China, one of their last remaining allies, has put the fear of complete isolation into the minds of Pyongyang’s leadership. Now that the new Kim has shown his father’s generals he’s no push over maybe he’ll move on to the real work at hand – the economy. After closing Kaesong (one of the few legitimate hard currency earners for the regime) the North now wants to talk with South Korea about re-opening the joint project.

Nothing coming out of the DPRK should be taken at face value, of course – the propaganda machine sounding war drums, or conciliatory economic gestures. The regime still has a horrible human rights record, continues to pursue a nuclear capability and remains a card carrying member of the pariah states club (including Iran and Syria), but in the world of international diplomacy, where there’s more gray than black and white, it’s high time for some serious talk. Bilateral, multilateral, whatever works. Talk is cheap and it isn’t a reward for rattling the region, but it may just create an opening for Kim to try out a new tactic – engagement. Missile firings along with the capture of an American citizen have failed to gain him the audience he wants, except for a repeat visit by Dennis Rodman scheduled for August.

China’s New Law of the Sea – but Might Still Doesn’t Makes Right

Meanwhile, China’s “take first, ask questions later” approach to territorial disputes in the shared waters of East and Southeast Asia continues to rankle its neighbors. We’ve reached a new low in regional relations. What started out as fishing boat bravado has escalated dramatically into full-scale military involvement. Now the cat and mouse game plays out around the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands with Japan upping the ante, and military budget, to confront an increasingly aggressive Chinese navy. Southeast Asia hasn’t fared much better. No agreement has been reached, despite diplomatic overtures for two years running, on how to resolve overlapping claims now completely subsumed under China’s self-claimed control.

Risks of accidental firings aside its now clear to everyone in the region that China’s “peaceful rise” has given way to a long rumored, now actualized policy of regional dominance. It might not be the Cold War part 2, but it certainly looks a lot like back-to-the-future with a new Chinese imperial sense of historical retribution for past colonial ills. The rest of the world has since moved on. Perhaps the “China Dream” should include a broader vision of regional integration without any one country needing to dominate.

Unfortunately for Asia the moment for a regional security architecture passed decades ago (about when NATO was formed and former aggressor states like Germany sat down with Britain and France). Now it’s left to the U.S. and its Asia pivot to cobble together long historical “frenemies” into a semi-cohesive whole. That attempt runs head long into China’s economic leverage that so far successfully divides the region (and ASEAN in particular) by holding trade hostage (from Philippine fruit imports that suddenly show signs of infestation to rare earth metals vital to Japan’s high-tech industry).

Countries are already trying to diversify their export markets and sourcing while the infinite promise of a large and expanding Chinese market comes under new strains. If cooler heads prevail, then the benefits of a cooperative future and greater regional integration will win out over a divisive re-playing of threats and counter-threats in the age-old struggle for power and control.

For updates on new commentary connect via Twitter @brianpklein or sign-up for email alerts (your address will not be sold, shared, or used for any monitoring. Promise.)